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The Offshore Shell Game: U.S. Corporate Tax 
Avoidance Through Profit Shifting 
Tracy A. Kaye* 
I. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
On March 12, 2014, the Bloomberg News headline read Cash 
Abroad Rises $206 Billion as Apple to IBM Avoid Tax.1 The 
article goes on to note that U.S. multinational corporations “have 
accumulated $1.95 trillion outside the U.S., up 11.8 percent 
from” last year, with the offshore profits of Apple Inc., Microsoft 
Corp., and International Business Machines Corp. comprising 
18.2% ($37.5 billion) of the total increase.2 A tax and budget 
advocate at the U.S. Public Interest Research Group stated that 
“[t]he loopholes in our tax code right now give such a big reward 
to companies that use gimmicks to make it look like they earn 
their profits offshore.”3 
This press coverage is important because public perception 
matters to legislators on Capitol Hill and the public is becoming 
increasingly aware of the corporate tax avoidance issue. In fact, 
there is global concern that U.S. multinationals are using 
transfer pricing rules and other techniques to shift reported 
income to low-tax countries without actually changing where 
they invest their resources.4 Profit shifting allows U.S. 
multinationals to maintain their actual investments in high-tax 
countries that have the appropriate infrastructure and labor 
forces necessary for actual business operations but report profits 
 
 * Professor of Law, Eric Byrne Research Fellow, Seton Hall University School of 
Law. B.S., University of Illinois; M.S.T., DePaul University; J.D., Georgetown University 
Law Center. I would like to gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Yasmine 
Fulena, David Marella, Stephanie Pisko, and Trang Nguyen as well as the financial 
support provided by the Seton Hall University School of Law Dean’s Research Fellowship 
program and the Chapman Law Review Symposium. 
 1 Richard Rubin, Cash Abroad Rises $206 Billion as Apple to IBM Avoid Tax, 
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 12, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-12/cash-abroad-
rises-206-billion-as-apple-to-ibm-avoid-tax.html (“The largest U.S.-based companies 
added $206 billion to their stockpiles of offshore profits last year, parking earnings in 
low-tax countries until Congress gives them a reason not to.”). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4150, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 2 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ 
files/cbofiles/attachments/43764_MultinationalTaxes_rev02-28-2013.pdf. 
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in tax havens or low-tax jurisdictions. This tax avoidance is 
accomplished by transfers of intellectual property or intangibles 
to low-tax jurisdictions, the allocation of debt to high-tax 
countries, and transfer pricing strategies with respect to goods.5 
The United States’s transfer pricing rules (section 482 and 
the accompanying Treasury regulations)6 require that the pricing 
of sales and services transactions between members of the 
multinational group use an arm’s length standard in order to 
protect the U.S. tax base. These rules are necessary to ensure 
that taxpayers do not shift income properly attributable to the 
United States to a related foreign company.7 However, a 2013 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) study states that U.S. 
multinationals “reported earning 43% of their overseas profits in 
the country group comprised of Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, and Switzerland” in 2008, while only 4% of 
their foreign employees and 7% of their foreign investment was 
located in those jurisdictions.8 On the other hand, Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Mexico, and the United Kingdom only 
accounted for 14% of their overseas profits with 40% of foreign 
employees and 34% of foreign investment located in these 
jurisdictions.9 All this evidence strongly indicates profit shifting. 
Furthermore, a 2008 Government Accountability Office study 
noted that 83% of the 100 largest publicly traded U.S. 
corporations have subsidiaries in tax havens or banking secrecy 
jurisdictions.10 
It is clear that the transfer pricing rules are not functioning 
as intended. The Internal Revenue Service estimates that it is 
involved in income shifting controversies with respect to 
approximately 250 taxpayers involving $68 billion in potential 
 
 5 JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 8–11 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf. 
 6 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
 7 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING 5 (Comm. 
Print 2010), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3692. 
“Absent transfer pricing rules, the lack of external market forces would permit 
multinational groups to shift income in any manner they choose among group members.”  
Id. at 18. 
 8 MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42927, AN ANALYSIS OF WHERE 
AMERICAN COMPANIES REPORT PROFITS: INDICATIONS OF PROFIT SHIFTING 4–5 (2013), 
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42927.pdf. 
 9 Id. 
 10 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-157, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: 
LARGE U.S. CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL CONTRACTORS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN 
JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS TAX HAVENS OR FINANCIAL PRIVACY JURISDICTIONS 4 (2008), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09157.pdf. 
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income adjustments.11 Furthermore, these transfer pricing 
problems are particularly acute where intellectual property and 
other intangibles are involved.12 At a hearing held in May 2013, 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of the U.S. 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 
heard testimony on the shifting of profits offshore by U.S. 
multinationals. The PSI’s report explained how Apple Inc. shifted 
billions of profits to Ireland where it had “negotiated a special 
corporate tax rate of less than two percent” by “transferr[ing] the 
economic rights to its intellectual property through a cost sharing 
arrangement” with its offshore subsidiaries.13 A cost sharing 
agreement allows “related entities to share the cost of developing 
an intangible asset and a proportional share of the rights to the 
intellectual property that results.”14 The Treasury Department 
estimated the potential loss of revenues to the government from 
this profit shifting as ranging between $10 billion to $80 billion 
annually,15 while a CRS study that summarized the economic 
research reported approximate revenue losses between 
$30 billion to $90 billion a year.16 
British, French, and Italian revenue agencies have also been 
scrutinizing the various American companies known as GAFA 
(Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple).17 The French 
government has even published an expert report on the taxation 
issues of the digital economy, calling for “urgent action.”18 In 
June 2012, the G-20 declared that base erosion and profit 
 
 11 The Shifting of Profits Offshore by U.S. Multinational Corporations: Hearing 
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 6 (2013) (written testimony of Samuel M. 
Maruca, Director, Transfer Pricing Operations, Internal Revenue Serv.), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=35c9f013-0b45-43d7-809a-1737db468345. 
 12 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/ajca2007.pdf. 
 13 The Shifting of Profits Offshore by U.S. Multinational Corporations: Hearing 
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) [hereinafter PSI Report] 
(memorandum from Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, and Sen. John McCain, Ranking 
Minority Member, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations), available at 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/ download/exhibit1a_profitshiftingmemo_apple. 
 14 Id. at 7–8. 
 15 The Shifting of Profits Offshore by U.S. Multinational Corporations: Hearing 
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and 
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (written testimony of Mark Mazur, Assistant 
Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury), available at http://www.hs 
gac.senate.gov/download/?id=28f352a5-87d2-4c16-9262-ca629ab17fe8s. 
 16 KEIGHTLEY, supra note 8, at 1–2 (citations omitted). 
 17 See id. at 2–3; see also Rubin, supra note 1. 
 18 PIERRE COLLIN & NICOLAS COLIN, TASK FORCE ON TAXATION OF THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY 3 (2013). For a summary of the report, see Alberto Pluviano, The French 
Government Report on the Taxation of the Digital Economy, 10 DIRITTO E PRATICA 
TRIBUTARIA INTERNAZIONALE 97 (2013). 
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shifting must be prevented and called upon the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to get involved 
in this issue.19   
II. OECD BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT 
The OECD issued a report on base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS) in February 2013. This BEPS report reviews various data 
and studies, finding an increased separation between the 
locations of the actual business activities and the reporting of 
profits for tax purposes.20 The OECD followed up this report in 
July 2013 with an Action Plan of fifteen steps to address profit 
shifting by multinational corporations and move toward 
international coherence in corporate income taxation.21 The 
OECD BEPS Action Plan targets harmful tax practices by 
establishing a working party on aggressive tax planning and by 
requiring disclosure of aggressive tax planning arrangements as 
well as the global allocation among countries of the income, 
economic activity, and taxes paid to the relevant tax 
administrations.22 Actions 8–10 focus on various transfer pricing 
issues, including those with respect to intangibles, so as to 
“[a]ssure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value 
creation.”23  
The OECD BEPS Action Plan seeks to realign taxation with 
the relevant economic substance and ensure that taxable profits 
cannot be artificially shifted.24 By the end of 2015, expect 
recommendations for revisions to domestic tax laws, the OECD 
Model Tax Convention, the Commentary to the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as well 
as the development of a multilateral instrument to facilitate 
implementation of these recommendations.25 The OECD’s 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs has already released for public 
comment, discussion drafts of the tax issues surrounding the 
digital economy, hybrid entities and instruments, and transfer 
pricing guidelines for intangibles, along with a discussion draft 
on preventing treaty abuse.  
 
 19 The OECD is a fifty-year-old influential forum where over thirty governments, 
including the United States, come together to discuss tax and economic policy, among 
other topics, and set international standards. 
 20 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 15 (2013). 
 21 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013) [hereinafter 
OECD BEPS ACTION PLAN].  
 22 See id. Action 5, at 18, Actions 11–12, at 21–22. 
 23 Id. Actions 8–10, at 20. 
 24 Id. at 13–14. 
 25 Id. Action 15, at 24–25. 
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In 2013, G-20 finance ministers unanimously endorsed the 
OECD BEPS Action Plan at their July 20 meeting in Moscow,26 
as did the G-20 Leaders on September 6.27 Note that the G-20 
includes countries such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, Russia, 
Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and Argentina that are not 
members of the OECD but may participate in this project as 
Associates “on an equal footing with OECD members.”28  
III. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION AND PROPOSALS 
The United States issued a joint statement with the Nordic 
countries at the G-20 Summit in Russia supporting the OECD 
efforts on base erosion and profit shifting issues and is actively 
participating in the BEPS project.29 In 2012, President Obama 
issued The President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform, 
declaring that “empirical evidence suggests that income-shifting 
behavior by multinational corporations is a significant concern 
that should be addressed through tax reform.”30 The Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has recommended 
strengthening the transfer pricing rules with respect to 
intellectual property as well as various Subpart F reforms.31  
Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the PSI, reintroduced his 
legislation, the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, in September 2013 to 
“[l]imit incentives to move intellectual property and related 
marketing rights offshore . . . .”32 A CRS report on tax havens 
 
 26 Kevin A. Bell, G-20 Finance Ministers Meeting in Moscow Unanimously Back 
Anti-Evasion Action Plan, INT’L TAX MONITOR, July 24, 2013, at 8. 
 27 G20 Leaders’ Declaration, G20 (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.g20.org/news/2013 
0906/782776427.html (“We fully endorse the ambitious and comprehensive Action Plan—
originated in the OECD—aimed at addressing base erosion and profit shifting . . . . We 
welcome the establishment of the G20/OECD BEPS project and we encourage all 
interested countries to participate. Profits should be taxed where economic activities 
deriving the profits are performed and where value is created.”).  
 28 See OECD BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 21, at 25. 
 29 Joint Statement by Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of Finland, Republic of 
Iceland, Kingdom of Norway, Kingdom of Sweden, and the United States of America, 
WHITE HOUSE OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.white house.gov/the-
press-office/2013/09/04/joint-statement-kingdom-denmark-republic-finland-republic-icelan 
d-kingdo. 
 30 THE WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR 
BUSINESS TAX REFORM 7 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf.  
 31 PSI Report, supra note 13, at 6. The Subpart F regime requires current U.S. 
taxation on the domestic parent corporation for certain types of income earned by certain 
foreign corporations known as controlled foreign corporations. See I.R.C. §§ 951–964. 
Subpart F defines which income is not eligible for the deferral regime: for example, 
income from the sales of foreign property to related parties. I.R.C. § 951. 
 32 Summary of the Levin-Whitehouse-Begich-Shaheen Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act S. 
1533, CARL LEVIN U.S. SENATOR MICH. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.levin.senate.gov/news 
room/press/release/summary-of-the-levin-whitehouse-begich-shaheen-stop-tax-haven-abus 
e-act. 
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summarizes the numerous policy options available to address 
corporate profit shifting.33 
International tax reform proposals in the Administration’s 
Fiscal Year 2015 budget released March 2014 include the current 
taxation of excess returns associated with transfers of intangibles 
offshore, the creation of a new category of Subpart F income for 
transactions involving digital goods or services, as well as 
deferral of the interest expense deduction related to the deferred 
income of the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational 
corporations.34 Other changes to discourage the shifting of profits 
offshore include restricting the use of hybrid arrangements that 
create stateless income and limiting the shifting of income 
through intangible property transfers.35 The proposals to reform 
the U.S. international tax system would raise approximately 
$276 billion from U.S. multinationals over the next ten years.36 
No one expects these provisions to be enacted immediately, but 
they are an important message to the international community 
as to the U.S. Administration’s preferred solutions to the BEPS 
problem! 
CONCLUSION 
The United States is facing serious issues with respect to the 
base erosion and income shifting problems outlined in the BEPS 
Report and testimony given at the Hearings on Offshore Profits 
Shifting Before the Senate PSI. These issues need to be 
substantively addressed before any effort should be made on 
proposals to exempt foreign income or to change the U.S. 
international tax regime to a territorial system. The United 
States should participate fully in the OECD’s effort to address 
the base erosion problem and begin making the necessary 
adjustments to the U.S. international tax regime that currently 
enables U.S. multinational corporations to legally avoid corporate 
taxes. The regulatory and statutory fixes needed for the U.S. 
international tax regime have been identified and should be 
adopted. 
 
 
 33 GRAVELLE, supra note 5, at 24–29. 
 34 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 45–46, 49–50, 58–59 (2014), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2 
015.pdf.  
 35 Id. at 47, 61. 
 36 Id. at 280. 
 
